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Argument
A native Spanish-speaker with a fifth-grade education who asserted selfdefense during his guilty plea hearing, even after his trial counsel assured the
court that they had discussed imperfect self-defense, did not knowingly plead
guilty to murder. His assertions of self-defense negated an essential element of
murder. And no one resolved his self-defense assertions on the record.
With these facts, Petitioner Benjamin Arriaga’s petition for postconviction
relief should have survived summary judgment. But it did not. This Court should
reverse the Court of Appeals and reverse the district court’s order granting
summary judgment in favor of the State.
The State disagrees. It argues that Mr. Arriaga’s argument on appeal is not
preserved and that Mr. Arriaga’s plea met all the constitutional requirements for
a valid guilty plea. But none of the State’s arguments have merit.
1.

Mr. Arriaga’s Guilty Plea Claim Is Preserved
The State argues that Mr. Arriaga’s claim that his plea was not knowing or

voluntary was not preserved in the district court. It asserts that the plea issue was
raised for the first time in Mr. Arriaga’s summary judgment opposition. But the
State is incorrect.
In his Second Amended Petition, Mr. Arriaga claimed that his plea was not
knowing or voluntary. In that petition, Mr. Arriaga asserted that “during the plea
colloquy, [Mr. Arriaga] told the Court that he acted in self-defense, manifesting
that he did not agree that he had committed the crime of murder.” (R. 448.)
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Accordingly, he listed as a ground for relief that his “conviction was obtained by a
plea of guilty that was unlawfully induced or not made voluntarily with
understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea.” (R.
450.)
The State argues that Mr. Arriaga’s guilty-plea claim in his petition was not
specific enough; it seems to argue that Mr. Arriaga’s guilty-plea issue was not
preserved because the State did not understand the full nature of Mr. Arriaga’s
legal arguments until the summary judgment stage. The State seems to advocate
for a higher pleading standard than is required. Postconviction petitioners are
only required to state in their petitions “in plain and concise terms, all of the facts
that form the basis of the petitioner’s claim to relief.” Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(d)(3).
Petitioners are not allowed to “set forth argument or citations or discuss
authorities in the petition.” Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(f).
The pleading standards for postconviction petitions are like those in civil
complaints. Civil complaints “must contain a short and plain . . . statement of the
claim showing that the party is entitled to relief.” Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a). Utah’s
pleading standard is a “liberal notice pleading standard,” where “the plaintiff
must only give the defendant fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the
claim and a general indication of the type of litigation involved.” City of
Grantsville v. Redevelopment Agency of Tooele City, 2010 UT 38, ¶ 35, 233 P.3d
461 (quotation omitted).
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In this case, Mr. Arriaga stated in “plain and concise terms,” without
“argument or citations or . . . authorities,” that his guilty plea was not knowing
and voluntary because he asserted self-defense during the plea colloquy. Utah R.
Civ. P. 65C(d)(3), (f); R. 448, 450. He gave the State fair notice of his guilty-plea
issue.
Mr. Arriaga certainly fleshed out his guilty-plea issue in his opposition to
the State’s summary judgment motion. He had to. The summary judgment stage
demands thorough analysis. He articulated how a claim of self-defense renders a
guilty plea to murder not knowing because it negates an essential element of the
plea. (R. 1109–11.) He discussed how trial counsel’s and the district court’s
discussion on the record about the elements of murder did not resolve his selfdefense assertions. (R. 1110–11.) And he explained how imperfect self-defense
could apply to his situation. (Id.) But all these discussions boil down to one
simple issue, the one Mr. Arriaga summarized in his petition: his guilty plea was
not knowing or voluntary because he asserted self-defense during his plea
colloquy.
The preservation rule requires a party “to raise the issue in the trial court in
such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue.” State v.
Bird, 2015 UT 7, ¶ 10, 345 P.3d 1141 (quotation omitted). “To properly preserve
an issue at the district court, the following must take place: (1) the issue must be
raised in a timely fashion; (2) the issue must be specifically raised; and (3) a party
must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal authority.” O'Dea v. Olea,
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2009 UT 46, ¶ 18, 217 P.3d 704 (quotation omitted). Mr. Arriaga satisfied all
three factors.
Mr. Arriaga raised his guilty-plea issue in a timely matter: in his petition
and in his opposition to the State’s summary judgment motion. (R. 448, 450,
1108–1112.) He discussed the issue specifically in his opposition, he supported his
issue with legal authority, and the State replied to it. (R. 1108–12, 1202.) Mr.
Arriaga then argued at length in the summary judgment hearing that his plea was
not knowing or voluntary. (R. 1323–41.) And the district court rejected that
argument in its order; it concluded that all “the constitutional prerequisites for a
valid guilty plea were satisfied in Mr. Arriaga’s case.” (R. 1270.) The district court
had the opportunity to thoroughly assess and consider Mr. Arriaga’s guilty-plea
issue.
The preservation doctrine prevents appellants from raising issues on
appeal that were inadequately raised in the district court; the doctrine promotes
judicial efficiency by allowing district courts to correct errors and make reasoned
decisions before the issues are brought to the appellate courts, and the doctrine
prevents appellants from surprising appellees with arguments on appeal never
before raised.
Addressing the merits of this case upholds the purposes of the preservation
doctrine. Mr. Arriaga gave the district court evidence and legal authority
supporting his guilty-plea issue in his summary judgment opposition, and he
argued about his issue at length in the summary judgment hearing. (R. 1108–
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1112, 1323–41.) The district court was well aware of Mr. Arriaga’s guilty-plea
issue before it issued its order. Likewise, the State was well aware of Mr. Arriaga’s
guilty-plea issue during the summary judgment proceedings and had an
opportunity to respond. Mr. Arriaga’s guilty-plea issue in his appeal comes as no
surprise to the State.

2.

Mr. Arriaga’s Plea Was Not Knowing or Voluntary
Mr. Arriaga’s guilty plea was not knowing or voluntary. Twice during the

plea hearing he made self-defense claims that negated an essential element of the
murder charge and provided objective evidence that he did not understand the
proceedings.
The State’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. In fact, the State
does not address the case law that holds that a defendant’s statements during a
plea colloquy that negate an element of a crime can render a plea not knowing or
voluntary. See United States v. Culbertson, 670 F.3d 183, 190 (2d Cir. 2012)
(vacating guilty plea when the defendant persistently disavowed responsibility for
a certain amount of drugs during the colloquy, and the amount of drugs was an
essential element of the crime); United States v. Pineda-Buenaventura, 622 F.3d
761, 771 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that Spanish-speaking defendant did not
understand the nature of the conspiracy charges against him when he made
statements during his plea hearing that showed he did not understand the
concept of conspiracy or the specific acts to which he was pleading guilty); United
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States v. Fernandez, 205 F.3d 1020, 1026, 1030 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that
Spanish-speaking defendant did not understand charges he was pleading to when
he made statements during the colloquy that showed he was confused and the
district court did not clear up his confusion); People v. Ramirez, 839 N.Y.S.2d
327, 329 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007) (holding that plea was not voluntary when
defendant made statements during the colloquy that negated his plea and district
court did not conduct a sufficient inquiry); State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 375
(Utah 1996) (holding that even though defendant acknowledged at one point he
had the appropriate mental state, he made repeated comments that negated his
admission and consequently did not admit to the requisite mental state).
Instead, the State incorrectly asserts that the absence of self-defense is not
an essential element of murder, citing an old Utah Supreme Court case (State v.
Knoll, 712 P.2d 211 (Utah 1985)) for support. But much more recently, this Court
held that “[a] necessary element of a murder conviction is the absence of
affirmative defenses.” State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, ¶ 45, 192 P.3d 867 (emphasis
added). “It is fundamental that the State carries the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt each element of an offense, including the absence of an
affirmative defense once the defense is put into issue.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Mr. Arriaga put the affirmative defense of imperfect self-defense at issue when he
twice asserted self-defense during the plea colloquy. Consequently, “the absence
of affirmative defenses [was] an element of murder” in Mr. Arriaga’s case. Id.
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The State also asserts that the plea affidavit and Mr. Arriaga’s one-worded
answers to the district court’s questions rendered the plea knowing and
voluntary. But the plea affidavit did not mention self-defense. (R. 79–89.) And
Mr. Arriaga’s monosyllabic answers to the district court’s questions are far less
indicative of his understanding of the plea than his multi-worded assertions in
his native Spanish that he acted in self-defense.
Finally, the State improperly relies on Mr. Arriaga’s experience with the
criminal justice system to assume that Mr. Arriaga knew what he was doing in
this case. The State argues that because Mr. Arriaga pleaded guilty in 2003 and
2004 to misdemeanors and third-degree felonies that he knew how his firstdegree murder plea would pan out. But that claim is entirely speculative. The
record does not give any indication about what type of representation Mr. Arriaga
received in those cases. And those pleas occurred about seven years before the
plea in this case, and those earlier pleas were to crimes far less serious. Assuming
Mr. Arriaga knew what he was doing because he had pleaded guilty seven years
before is a speculative leap this Court should not take.
This Court need not worry that a ruling in Mr. Arriaga’s favor would open
the floodgates for other criminal defendants to challenge their guilty pleas. This
case presents a unique situation where a non-English-speaking defendant made
self-defense claims during the plea colloquy that were not resolved by the district
court or trial counsel.
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Had anyone explained on the record the implications of and burden of
proof for the self-defense claim, had the plea affidavit included information about
self-defense, had Mr. Arriaga recanted his self-defense claim—had any of those
things happened, Mr. Arriaga’s postconviction appeal would not be meritorious.
But none of those things happened. And because they did not, Mr. Arriaga’s
guilty plea was not knowing or voluntary. Mr. Arriaga respectfully requests that
this Court reverse the judgment of the district court and the Court of Appeals.
Conclusion
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Arriaga, this Court
should conclude that Mr. Arriaga’s plea was not knowing or voluntary and was
the result of ineffective assistance of counsel. Mr. Arriaga requests that this Court
reverse the Court of Appeals and reverse the district court’s order granting
summary judgment in favor of the State.
DATED this 9th day of May 2019.
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